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I. Introduction
You are taking a quick nap while relaxing in the back seat
of a Greyhound bus bound from Miami to Atlanta. As the bus
makes a temporary stop-over in Ft. Lauderdale, you are sud-
denly awakened to find two police officers towering over you.
Trying to overcome your drowsiness, you hear the officers iden-
tify themselves as agents from the Sheriff's Office who state that
they are searching out drug traffickers. You are asked some
questions about your travel plans, and are requested to produce
some corroborating documentation. What is your likely reaction
in such circumstances? Would you feel that it was your citizen's
duty to give your full cooperation to the officers and voluntarily
help them out in any way possible? If so, be sure to congratulate
yourself. You have just freely consented to the police encounter,
and have relieved the officers of the burden of showing that
there was any justification for a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. What's that you say? You're a bit cranky from be-
ing disturbed, and not quite in the mood to play helpful citizen
just now? How comfortable would you feel about telling those
imposing gentlemen blocking your path that you want them to
get lost? Is that a realistic option, or might you fear repercus-
sions? Is it actually possible to delineate the point at which such
an encounter crosses the line from consensual to coercive?
Distinguishing between when such confrontations are
merely harmless casual questioning and when they become coer-
cive enough to reach the level of a seizure' under the Fourth
Amendment has always been a troublesome task for the United
States Supreme Court.2 Over the past few decades, the Court
1. For the purposes of this article, the term "seizure" is used generically to apply to
those police-citizen encounters that fall within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
2. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (finding a "stop and frisk" to be a permissi-
ble seizure), United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (stating that "[w]e
adhere to the view that a person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a
1
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:615
has been presented with several cases that led the Court to for-
mulate its test for when a police-citizen encounter reaches the
level of a seizure.' During the 1990-91 term, the Court was of-
fered yet another opportunity to clarify its position. The case of
Florida v. Bostick4 provided the Court with facts similar to the
above illustration. Whereas up until now, most cases of investi-
gatory stops had involved individuals being approached in wide
open public arenas, such as airport terminals,5 Bostick was the
first case to present the issue to the Court where the police-citi-
zen encounter occurred within very confined quarters.6
The Supreme Court's decision to remand the case back to
the Florida courts left some initial doubt as to whether Bostick
was actually seized within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.
However, while the Court did not specifically address whether
Bostick had been seized under these circumstances, it pointed
the way for lower courts to find that a seizure does not necessa-
rily occur during investigative stops within close quarters.8
This article will examine the ongoing trend of the current
Supreme Court to whittle away at individual rights in an at-
tempt to balance these rights against societal needs. Section II
contains an historical overview of the existing case law defining
show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."), Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983) (restating the Mendenhall "free to leave" test to determine when a seizure
had occurred), Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215
(1984) (finding no seizure where there is a consensual encounter, and noting that
"(g]iven the diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens.., the Court has
been cautious in defining the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment on encounters
between the police and citizens."), and Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (not-
ing in its unanimous decision that the "free to leave" test requires the objective standard
of the reasonable person). The Court in Royer specifically noted that there was no "lit-
mus-paper test" to determine when a consensual encounter escalates into a seizure, and
that there are too many fact variables to make a hard and fast rule. 460 U.S. at 506. See
discussion infra part C of this section, outlining the evolution of a definition of a
"seizure."
3. See infra part II.B.
4. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
5. See supra note 2.
6. Previously, the Court had considered the issue of police-citizen encounters in the
context of public areas such as airport lobbies (United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980) and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) and streets (Michigan v. Ches-
ternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988)). In Bostick, the Court was presented with a fact pattern
where the individual was seated in the rear of a bus. 111 S. Ct. at 2384.
7. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
8. Id. at 2387-88.
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when a seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes. Section
III traces the procedural history leading up to the Supreme
Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick and details the Court's
holding. Section IV analyzes the impact of the Court's decision
and considers its ramifications on future law enforcement activ-
ity. Section V concludes that the conservative majority of the
Supreme Court is more intent on viewing the Fourth Amend-
ment as a means to effective law enforcement,9 than as a protec-
tor of personal freedom.
II. Background
A. The Cornerstone of Individual Protection from Seizure:
The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment declares:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.10
Perhaps more so than any other amendment, the Fourth
Amendment was specifically formulated to protect against the
evils of colonial rule that the founding fathers found so offen-
sive.11 The events leading up to the Bill of Rights contain many
instances of historic abuse that the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect against.12 Among all of the safeguards item-
ized in the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures is likely the most
9. This appears especially so to achieve the end of effective drug enforcement.
10. US. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Dis-
cretion, 17 U. bfcn. J.L. REF. 551, 560 (1984) (noting the concern that the new govern-
ment would "revive the sorts of oppressions that the colonists had experienced under
British rule."). A specific fear was the unchecked police power of searches and seizures.
Id.
12. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886) (explaining the
historical events leading up to the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights, such as the colonial practice of issuing writs of assistance for the purpose of
searching for smuggled goods and the issuance of general warrants in order to search
private homes).
1992]
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profound.13 Its formulation was a clear reaction to the founding
fathers' distaste of violations of personal privacy, and was
among the first limits they sought to impose on the new
government.14
In order to ascertain if there has been a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the courts must first determine when a par-
ticular governmental activity actually falls within the scope of
the Amendment.15 The general assumption is that where the ac-
tivity can be classified as a "search" or "seizure" it will qualify
as falling within the protection of the Amendment. 6 Clearly, in
order to make such a classification, the courts need to have a
reliable working definition of the terms "search" and "seizure."
This has been a difficult task, especially in light of the way this
particular area of law is constantly evolving.17 The background
section will focus on recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions that have attempted to determine when a "seizure" occurs
for Fourth Amendment purposes, and how these decisions have
led the Court to its holding in Florida v. Bostick.
13. See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 377 (1974) (commenting that "I can think of few constitutional issues more
important than defining the reach of the fourth amendment - the extent to which it
controls the array of activities of the police.... I can think of few issues more important
to a society than the amount of power that it permits its police to use without effective
control by law.").
14. See Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis stated in his dissent that
[t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness... They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone - the most prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (stating
that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the
police and the citizenry, but "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by en-
forcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.").
15. See Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 388 ("to label any police activity a 'search' or
,seizure' within the ambit of the [fourth] amendment is to impose [those] restrictions on
it. On the other hand, if it is not labeled a 'search' or 'seizure,' it is subject to no signifi-
cant restrictions of any kind."). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) ("[i]f
there is no detention - no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment - then no constitutional rights have been infringed.").
16. 460 U.S. at 498.
17. See discussion infra part B of this section, outlining the evolution of the defini-
tion of a "seizure."
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B. The Evolving Definition of Seizure Prior to Bostick
1. Reasonable Seizure Without a Warrant or Probable
Cause: Terry v. Ohio 8
In Terry, the Court underscored the definition of seizure by
stating that a person is considered seized when the police, "by
means of physical force or show of authority, ha[ve] in some way
restrained [his] liberty."10 Prior to Terry, courts held that the
police must either act pursuant to a warrant, or have probable
cause in order for such a seizure to be valid.2 0 This requirement
had the effect of severely restricting law enforcement activities. 21
The issue of whether the police could detain a suspect without
probable cause had never been decisively dealt with.22 However,
the Terry Court faced just such a fact pattern, in which a sus-
pect was detained and frisked without a warrant or probable
cause.23 The circumstances of Terry provided the Court with an
opportunity to examine the Fourth Amendment implications of
18. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
19. Id. at 19 n.16.
20. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "police officers up to today have
been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within
their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. At
the time of their 'seizure' without a warrant they must possess facts concerning the per-
son arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that 'probable cause' was indeed pre-
sent."). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (holding search incidental to
arrest invalid where there was no probable cause). The Henry court explained that "[i]t
is important, we think, that this requirement [of probable cause] be strictly enforced, for
the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen." Id. at 102.
See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
21. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 10 (1968) (commenting on the argument that po-
lice should be permitted to stop and frisk individuals without probable cause, so as not
to be restricted in their handling of potentially dangerous situations). See generally Tra-
cey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1268 (1990) (noting that "[a] strict reading of precedent
by the Terry Court would have led to a conclusion unfavorable to the traditional law
enforcement community.").
22. See 1 WAYNE R LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.8 at
292 (1984) (noting that the right of police to detain a suspect against his will had been
both ignored and dealt with ambiguously).
23. 392 U.S. 1. While on routine patrol, a police officer approached the defendant
and two other individuals. Based on the officer's many years of experience, he suspected
that the three men might be planning to rob a store, so he identified himself and re-
quested that the men provide their identification. The officer then proceeded to grab the
defendant and pat him down. When the officer discovered a gun, the defendant was
arrested. Id. at 5-7.
5
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such a situation.
In its decision, the Supreme Court admitted that the de-
fendant had been seized under the Fourth Amendment,2' and
that the officer lacked probable cause for the seizure.25 Never-
theless, the Court found the seizure to be reasonable.28 In doing
so, the Court allowed limited pat-downs for the purpose of pro-
tecting an officer's safety while continuing an investigation based
on less than probable cause.27 The Court held that where suspi-
cious behavior leads a police officer to conclude that a crime may
be in progress, and that the suspect may be armed, the officer
may reasonably conduct a limited search for weapons in order to
protect himself.28 This lesser standard is referred to as "reasona-
ble suspicion, "29 and is predicated on a balancing test that
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. at 22 (explaining that the police officer was properly exercising his investiga-
tive function of effective crime prevention, even without having probable cause for ar-
rest, when he first approached Terry).
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id. (stating that the officer "is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."). See generally
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (companion case to Terry where the Court held
the search of the defendant to be unreasonable since there were no particular facts from
which an officer could reasonably infer he was in danger).
28. 392 U.S. at 30. The Court stated that:
[w]e merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identi-
fies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is
a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.
Id.
29. The Terry court never used the specific term "reasonable suspicion," but stated
the standard that "evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a
seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for
their initiation." 392 U.S. at 29. See also supra note 28. However, in the course of later
Supreme Court decisions, it became clear that this standard was being referred to as
"reasonable suspicion." An example of the Court's use of this phrase is United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), a case dealing with Mexican border patrol stops of
vehicles containing possible illegal aliens. There, the Court held that "when an officer's
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/4
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weighs the need to intrude against the severity of the
intrusion.30
2. Encounters With Less Than Reasonable Suspicion:
United States v. Mendenhall 1
Under the Terry rationale, police Were able to "seize" an
individual on less than probable cause in limited circum-
stances.3 2 The question then arose as to whether police could
constitutiona[ly stop and question individuals where even this
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion was lacking. 3 In United
States v. Mendenhall,3 4 the Court was presented with a scenario
where an individual was approached at an airport terminal on
the basis of fitting a "drug courier profile."3 5 The Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether the defendant was
"seized" when approached by law-enforcement authorities who
had neither a warrant nor probable cause to suspect her of drug-
observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens
who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circum-
stances that provoke suspicion." Id. at 881. The Brignoni-Ponce Court then went on to
state that it was "unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the require-
ment that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving-patrol stops." Id. at
882 (emphasis added). Four years later, the Court declared that unless there is an "ar-
ticulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or than an automobile is
not registered,... stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (emphasis added). Justice
Powell also used the term "reasonable suspicion" in his concurrence in United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), where he stated that "the federal agents had reasona-
ble suspicion that the respondent was engaging in criminal activity, and, therefore, that
they did not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping the respondent for routine
questioning." Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
30. 392 U.S. at 21. The Court noted that the officer "must be able to point to spe-
cific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant intrusion." Id.
31. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
33. See generally United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (holding
that officers may stop a vehicle near the Mexican border only where they have reasona-
ble suspicion that illegal aliens are being brought into the country). See also Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (holding that where officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
believe defendant had engaged in criminal conduct, detaining defendant for identifica-
tion purposes was an illegal seizure).
34. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
35. Id. at 547 n.1.
7
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trafficking.30
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that no
seizure had occurred. 7 He reasoned that "a person has been
'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a rea-
sonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."38 Justice Stewart then went on to find that under this
test, given the facts of the case, no such seizure had occurred.39
Justice Stewart stated that where the encounter took place in a
public arena such as an airport, and the defendant was not
physically restrained, she would have no reason to feel that she
was not free to leave.40 However, the Court recognized that po-
lice-citizen encounters can sometimes take on a coercive air, and
accordingly offered examples of behavior that might indicate a
seizure even where a defendant makes no attempt to leave.' 1
These examples included physical contact, display of weapons,
tone of language and threatening language by several officers.' 2
At the time the opinion was written, only Justice Rehnquist
specifically joined"3 in the formulation of this "free to leave"
test." However, as the Court continued to be presented with
cases of this nature and had further opportunities to clarify its
position, it soon became apparent that this "test" commanded a
36. Id. at 551. The Court noted the basic facts as follows: Two Drug Enforcement
Administrative agents approached the defendant in a crowded airport terminal, identi-
fied themselves, and then asked the defendant to produce both proof of her identifica-
tion and her airline tickets. Upon noticing a discrepancy between the defendant's name
on her driver's license, and the name on her airline ticket, the officers asked the defend-
ant to accompany them to their office for further questioning. The defendant agreed, and
was then asked to further agree to a body search as well an a handbag search, first being
told that she had the right to refuse. The defendant agreed to the search which revealed
narcotics, and the defendant was arrested. Id. 547-49.
37. Id. at 555.
38. Id. at 554.
39. Id. at 555. Two circuit court decisions involving airport seizures subsequently
relied on Mendenhall in finding no seizures to have occurred. See United States v.
Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th
Cir. 1982).
40. 466 U.S. at 555.
41. Id. at 554.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 545.
44. Id. at 554-55.
[Vol. 12:615
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majority of the Court's support. 5
3. Free To Leave Test Gains Support: Florida v. Royer."'
Any doubts as to the validity of the "free to leave" test were
resolved in a subsequent airport drug case decided by the Su-
preme Court. In Florida v. Royer, 7 the Court was once again
presented with a fact pattern involving drug agents approaching
the defendant in the middle of an airport.48 However, after the
initial encounter, the factual similarity with Mendenhall
ceased.49 Referring to actions that amounted to a show of official
authority, the Court found that a seizure had occurred.50 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court expressly relied on the "free
to leave" test set forth in MendenhaU,51 while at the same time,
distinguishing the facts of that case. 2 Furthermore, Justice
White separated the fact scenario of Royer into two levels.53 He
noted that the agent's act of merely approaching Royer and ask-
ing for identification was not enough, by itself, to implicate the
Fourth Amendment." It was only the additional act of retaining
Royer's papers, without any indication that he was free to leave,
that caused the situation to escalate into a seizure.5 5 Justice
45. For a chronological overview of cases illustrating the Court's subsequent treat-
ment of this "test" see, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion
with four Justices relying on the "free to leave" test); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215
(1984) (six Justice majority upholding "free to leave" test); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 567 (1988) (unanimous Court noting that the Supreme Court has now embraced the
Mendenhall test for seizure).
46. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 494. After identifying themselves, the agents asked Royer for permission
to speak with him, and Royer consented. Royer was then asked to produce his airline
ticket and driver's license and he again obliged. Id.
49. Once the defendant, Royer, produced the requested documents, the agents re-
tained them and asked Royer to accompany the agents to another location. Id.
50. Id. at 501. The agents gave the defendant no indication that his airline ticket or
driver's license would be returned. Id. See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984)
(finding no seizure in a consensual encounter that failed to implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment where an officer showed his badge to the defendant and requested that the defend-
ant walk over to other officers for questioning).
51. 460 U.S. at 501-502.
52. Id. at 503-04 n.9.
53. Id. at 501.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 501, 503.
9
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White reasoned that the initial consensual encounter had turned
into an arrest situation, for all practical purposes. 6
In its summation, the Court recognized the difficulty of for-
mulating a bright line test for determining when a consensual
stop becomes a seizure."7 Noting that most situations are ex-
tremely fact sensitive, the Court declined to issue a narrow
rule.8 Instead, the Court reiterated the Mendenhall "free to
leave" test. 9
4. The "Blame the Victim"80 Approach: Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Delgadoe1
In INS v. Delgado,2 the Court examined government action
that was aimed at eliminating still another societal problem;
that of illegal aliens.8 3 Instead of involving a suspect in an open
airport terminal, Delgado presented a situation in which INS
agents questioned workers during the course of their employ-
ment at a factory.8 ' The workers argued that they were seized
56. Id. at 503.
57. Id. at 506 (stating that "[wie do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for
distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop.").
58. Id. at 506-07 (stating that "[e]ven in the discrete category of airport encounters,
there will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it
is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will pro-
vide unarguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search
or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
59. Id. at 502. The'Court relied on the Mendenhall test by noting that there was no
problem with the officers approaching Royer and asking for his ticket and identification.
However, once Royer was informed that he was suspected of drug-trafficking and asked
to go to the police room while the officers retained possession of his airline ticket,
"[t]hese circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority sich that 'a reasona-
ble person would have believed that he was not free to leave."' Id. Subsequently, the
Court unanimously ratified the Mendenhall "free to leave" test adopted in Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). There, the Court found no seizure when a police car
followed alongside the defendant without the police activating sirens or flashers or com-
manding the defendant to halt. Id. at 575. The Court further noted that this test was
heavily dependent on the totality of the circumstances, id. at 573, and used the objective
standard of the reasonable person. Id.
60. See Macin, supra note 21, at 1305 (referring to the Delgado "blame the victim"
approach).
61. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 211-12. These "factory surveys" involved agents carrying weapons and
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/4
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due to the manner in which the survey was conducted.65 They
claimed that the agents created an atmosphere that caused the
employees to fear that they were not free to leave.a6
The Supreme Court held that no seizure had occurred, and
stated that the employees had "no reason to believe that they
would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions
put to them or if they simply refused to answer." 67 The Court
gave little weight to the employees' claim that their movements
were restricted by the presence of the INS agents.6 ' Instead, the
Court contended that any such restrictions were brought about
by the very nature of the employment itself.69 Accordingly, the
Court classified the questioning as a "classic consensual
encounter."70
5. Police-Citizen Encounters Within Close Confines:
United States v. Lewis 1
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit issued a decision that was a consolidation of two cases.7 2
Both appeals arose in the context of police-citizen encounters on
buses.7 In each case, police officers boarded buses at interim
points as part of a drug interdiction program, and requested
passengers to cooperate by producing tickets, responding to
questions, and agreeing to searches.74
badges randomly going up and down the aisles questioning factory workers as to their
citizenship status while other agents positioned themselves by the factory exits. Id.
65. Id. at 220.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 218.
68. Id.
69. Id. For further illustration of the "blame the victim" approach, see United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (holding that detaining the de-
fendant for 27 hours was reasonable where it was due to her own efforts to resist the
"call of nature.").
70. 466 U.S. at 221.
71. 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
72. This case merged appeals from United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C.
1990) with United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1990). 921 F.2d at 1295.
73. 921 F.2d at 1295.
74. Id. Defendant Lewis was seated on a bus when he was approached by an officer.
The officer showed his police identification and asked if he could talk to Lewis. Lewis
agreed and produced his ticket. After stating that he had neither luggage nor narcotics,
Lewis agreed to be searched. The officer discovered cocaine and Lewis was arrested. Id.
at 1296. Defendant Cothran was also approached while seated on a bus and agreed to
1992]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:615
In each case, the lower court held that the police practices
employed rose to the level of an unconstitutional seizure. 76 How-
ever, the circuit court concluded that no seizures occurred.76 In
reaching this decision, the court noted that no seizure occurs
merely because police officers approach a citizen and request
permission to talk with him.7 7  The court then considered
whether a different finding should result where the encounter
takes place on a bus.78 Noting that the lower courts had found
this location to be dispositive,7  the circuit court decided that
the fact that the encounter occurred on a bus should only be
considered a relevant factor.80 The court de-emphasized the im-
portance of the location by suggesting that any constraint on the
defendants' ability to leave was due to their choosing this partic-
ular mode of transportation.' Instead, the court stressed that
the proper inquiry should focus on whether each defendant was
"free to disregard the police presence and go about his
business. '8 2
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court
talk with the officer and show him her ticket. The officer also searched her coat and
handbag with her permission. Defendant Cothran claimed that her luggage had been
checked below. When the officer inquired about a bag in the overhead rack, Defendant
Cothran denied that it was hers. When no one else claimed the bag, the officer treated it
as abandoned and subjected it to a canine sniff test. When the bag tested positive for
narcotics, the officer opened it and discovered evidence linking the bag to Defendant
Cothran, who was then arrested. Id. at 1296-97.
75. Id. at 1296-97.
76. Id. at 1300.
77. Id. at 1297 (noting that the court is to consider such relevant factors as whether
the "officer displayed a weapon or handcuffs, wore a uniform, touched the individual
without permission, threatened or physically intimidated him, or retained his identifica-
tion or travel ticket.").
78. Id. at 1298.
79. Id. The lower courts had ruled that the defendants were not free to leave be-
cause they would have had to squeeze past the police officers and run the risk of being
stranded. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1299 (stating that the "bus passenger has voluntarily placed himself in
tight quarters, with a single avenue of exit that is narrow and frequently blocked by
people and luggage. For this cramped setting, he cannot blame law enforcement of-
ficers."). Id.
82. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988)). The court then
referred to United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 712 (holding that "[in this context,
freedom to leave means fundamentally the freedom to break off contact, in which case
the officers must, in the absence of objective justification, leave a passenger alone.").
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/4
FLORIDA v. BOSTICK
reasoned that the defendants should not have felt their "'busi-
ness' impeded by the officers' questioning. The officers neither
wore badges nor carried visible weapons."83 The court pointed
out that this was in direct contrast to the Bostick fact pattern,
where the officers not only wore badges and raid jackets, but
also carried a weapon.8 ' It subsequently held that no seizures
had occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes.85
6. Another Close Encounter of the Bus Kind: United
States v. Madison86
The Second Circuit decision in Madison was handed down
one week prior to the Supreme Court's ruling on Bostick." The
government asked the court of appeals to reverse the district
court's finding of a seizure where police officers questioned a bus
passenger.'8 Although the geographical locations differed, the
factual scenario of Madison bore a striking similarity to that of
Bostick.89 Both cases involved special drug interdiction pro-
grams that operate in bus terminals.90 As in Bostick,91 the of-
ficers approached a passenger seated on a bus about to depart
the terminal, and asked for permission to speak with him.92
However, unlike Bostick, the officers in Madison observed the
suspect at the terminal prior to his boarding the bus, but chose
not to approach him until he was seated on the bus.93
83. 921 F.2d at 1299.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1300.
86. 936 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1991).
87. Madison was decided on June 13, 1991. Id. at 90. One week later, on June 20,
1991, the Supreme Court decided Bostick. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
88. 936 F.2d at 92.
89. See discussion infra part M.A. Bostick arose on facts occurring in Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida, 111 S. Ct. at 2385, whereas Madison took place in New York City. 936 F.2d
at 91.
90. 936 F.2d at 91. See infra part I.A.
91. See infra part I.A.
92. 936 F.2d at 91-92. One officer approached Madison, identified himself, and asked
to speak with Madison, who agreed. The officer positioned himself behind Madison, and
a second officer stood two rows in front of him, partially blocking the aisle. The first
officer questioned Madison as to his travel plans and asked about a knapsack laying next
to Madison. When Madison denied ownership, the officers inspected the bag and discov-
ered crack. Id.
93. Id. at 91. Furthermore, Madison's trip initiated at the New York City terminal,
whereas Bostick was in Fort Lauderdale only on a stopover. Id. See also infra part M1.A.
19921
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The Second Circuit concluded that Madison was not seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he was
questioned aboard the bus. 4 The court found that a reasonable
person would have felt that he was free to disregard the officers
and go about his business.95 The court supported its finding by
noting that the officer questioning Madison never displayed any
behavior that would have led Madison to believe that he was
under any obligation to cooperate with the officer.96
Furthermore, the circuit court specifically discounted the
district court's reliance on the confined location of the bus in
finding a seizure.9 7 The court indicated that it was not con-
cerned with whether Madison had any desire to exit the bus, or
whether he would have been inconvenienced by so leaving.98 On
the contrary, the court stated that, "[c]onvenience and desire
are not dispositive; rather, the critical issue is whether Madison
could reasonably have believed that if he attempted to get off
the bus, he would have been prevented from doing so by [Of-
ficer] Canale." 9 Madisons options, according to the court, were
to voluntarily talk to the officer, leave the bus, or simply "stone-
wall" the officer. 100 Had the officer then used coercive tactics to
overcome Madison's resistance to questioning, the court admit-
ted that Madison would have no longer been free to go about his
business, and would have been considered seized. 10 1
The circuit court also noted that the district court below
had relied in part on the Florida Supreme Court's holding in
Bostick v. Florida.102 The circuit court, however, stated that
Bostick was distinguishable from the present case because the
facts in Bostick indicated that there was a "compelling show of
94. 936 F.2d at 92.
95. Id. at 94.
96. Id. at 93-94 (noting that the officer never touched the defendant, nor did he
display his weapon or speak aggressively).
97. Id. at 93-94, 95.
98. Id. at 94.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 95 (stating that, "[i]f he [Madison] did not wish to have further contact
with [Officer] Canale, he could have simply refused to answer the officer's questions and
continued sitting on the bus in silence, waiting for it to depart.").
101. Id. at 94-95.
102. Id. at 96 (citing Bostick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 241 (1990)).
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authority"103 which the court felt was absent in Madison.0 4
Therefore, it speculated that even if the United States Supreme
Court were to go ahead and affirm the Florida Supreme Court's
holding, "such a ruling would not be dispositive in this case."'' 0 5
C. Assuming No Seizure: Is Consent to Search Voluntary?
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
106
In light of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy
interests, where a person consents to police activity, he no longer
has a privacy interest at stake.0 7 Consequently, where a valid
consent is obtained, the Fourth Amendment is not even impli-
cated. 08 The major case dealing with the issue of valid consent
was Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,0 e which held that consent is
valid where it is given voluntarily and is not the product of du-
ress or coercion, either express or implied. 10 Schneckloth in-
volved a police request for permission to search where the party
was not informed of his right to refuse."'
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether
consent to a search is valid if the consenter is not aware that he
has a right to withhold such consent." ' In finding that such
awareness is not an absolute requirement, but merely one factor
to be considered in the "totality of the circumstances,"1 3 the
103. Id. at 96.
104. Id.
105. Id. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed and remanded the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
106. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
107. See 3 WAYNE LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEiZURE A TREATiSS ON THE FouRTH AMEND-
iENT § 8.1 at 148, (2d ed. 1987) (noting that since the Fourth Amendment only prohibits
unreasonable searches, where voluntary consent is given, the search becomes reasonable).
108. Id.
109. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
110. Id. at 248. The Court further stated that this "is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from the totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227. Factors to be considered
include "subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person who consents." Id. at 229. Consent will also be considered invalid
where it was in response to a "claim of lawful authority." Id. at 233.
111. Id. at 220. After stopping the vehicle for having a burned-out headlight, the
officer sought permission from one of the passengers to search the car's trunk. The pas-
senger replied "Sure, go ahead," and a subsequent finding of stolen checks led to another
passenger being charged with theft. Id.
112. Id. at 223.
113. Id. at 227.
19921
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Court reasoned that it is not necessary for the party to be in-
formed of his right to refuse.1 4 The Court acknowledged that by
refusing to require law enforcement personnel to inform a sus-
pect of his legal right to decline, the Court was, in effect, impos-
ing a lower standard of consent for Fourth Amendment issues
than for Fifth Amendment issues.11' The Court rationalized its
position by distinguishing between the different rights protected
under each Amendment.211 The Court pointed out the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent (as well as the Sixth Amend-
ment right to have a lawyer available during interrogation) is
closely related to the guarantee of a fair trial. 117 The Court con-
ceded that failure to give knowing consent in such instances
could ultimately result in the loss of one's personal freedom.11
In comparison, the Court noted that consent searches often take
place in non-custodial settings, so that the coercive element of
custody is generally absent and the Fourth Amendment would
not be implicated."9 The Court was also careful to recognize
that police might never get voluntary consent if they were forced
to inform each individual of his rights along the lines of the Mi-
randa warnings. 2 0
114. Id. at 231-33 (explaining that it would be too impractical to insist that search
subjects be informed of their right to refuse to consent, due to the informal nature of
such searches as well as the fact that they often arise without warning).
115. Id. at 241 (stating that "[t]here is a vast difference between those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of
trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to
be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.").
116. 412 U.S. at 242-43. The Court reasoned that consent to a slarch could not be
found to be unfair just because the consenter was not fully informed of the right to
refuse consent. However, such knowledge was deemed important to the goal of ensuring
that a criminal suspect in custody is not denied his fundamental right to refuse to in-
criminate himself. Id. But see LAFAVE, supra note 107 § 8.1(a), at 153 (stating that the
"protections of the Fourth Amendment have to do with privacy rather than accuracy in
the guilt-determination process, but it is never explained why unwitting surrender of the
right to privacy should not be a matter of concern.").
117. 412 U.S. at 236
118. Id. at 241, 244.
119. Id. at 247.
120. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing requirement of warnings
to be given in a custodial setting in order to avoid violation of self-incrimination
privilege).
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/4
1992] FLORIDA v. BOSTICK
III. Florida v. Bostick'21
A. Facts
In an effort to halt the increase in drug trafficking, Broward
County, Florida police officers have developed a program com-
monly referred to as "working the buses.1 2 This program en-
tails a procedure whereby police officers board buses during
scheduled stops and randomly ask passengers for permission to
search their luggage.123 During one such operation, two officers
from the Sheriff's Office boarded a Greyhound bus during a
stop-over in Fort Lauderdale.12 ' The bus originated in Miami,
with Atlanta being its final destination.1 25
Once the officers were on board, the bus driver left the bus
and closed the doors behind him.1 26 At that point, the officers
walked to the back of the bus where Terrance Bostick was re-
clining in the last seat.22 Bostick alleged that he was asleep at
the time, and that his feet were touched by one of the officers,
causing him to awaken.'2  The officers claimed that he was
merely resting.1 9 Bostick looked up to find the two officers
standing over him and partially blocking the aisle.130 Bostick
further alleged that one of the officers had his jacket open with
his hand on what Bostick presumed to be a gun.13 1 The officers
121. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
122. Id. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153,
1156-1157 (Fla. 1989)).
123. Id. at 2389-90 (Marshall, J. dissenting). The technique of "working the buses"
has been described as where "a group of state or federal officers will board a bus while it
is stopped at an intermediate point on its route. Often displaying badges, weapons, or
other indicia of authority, the officers identify themselves and announce their purpose to
intercept drug traffickers. They proceed to approach individual passengers, requesting
them to show identification, produce their tickets, and explain the purpose of their trav-
els. Never do the officers advise the passengers that they are free not to speak with the
officers. An 'interview' of this type ordinarily culminates in a request for consent to
search the passenger's luggage... These sweeps are conducted in a 'dragnet' style." Id.
124. Id. at 2384-85, 2392.
125. Id.
126. Brief of Respondent at 2 n.1, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-
1717).
127. Brief of Respondent at 2. See also 111 S. Ct. at 2392.
128. Brief of Respondent at 2 n.2.
129. Id.
130. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989).
131. Id.
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contended that while both were armed, their weapons were com-
pletely concealed. " 2
It was undisputed that the officers had no reasonable suspi-
cion to suspect Bostick, nor any other passenger on board, of
any crime.1 33 Nevertheless, they identified themselves, asked
Bostick where he was going, and if he would show them his bus
ticket and some identification.'s Bostick responded that he was
traveling to Atlanta and complied with the officers' request for
his documents. " 5 Both his ticket and his identification were in
order, and neither provided any grounds for heightened suspi-
cion."'6 Nevertheless, the officers continued to stand over Bos-
tick, and asked him for permission to search a red tote bag that
his head had been resting on.137 Bostick again complied, and the
search failed to uncover any contraband. "
At that point, one of the officers noticed a blue bag in the
overhead rack and asked for permission to search that bag
also.1 9 There is a dispute as to what happened next.14 0 The of-
ficers maintain that Bostick consented after being informed that
he could refuse, while Bostick claims that he was never told that
he had a right to refuse, and in fact never consented.14 1 In any
event, the subsequent search of the blue bag uncovered cocaine,
and Bostick was arrested.14 2 Bostick argued that he had been
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and there-
fore, that any subsequent "consent" to search his bags was
tainted as "fruit of the poisoned tree."14 3
132. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
(No. 89-1717).
133. 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
134. Id. at 2384-85.
135. Brief of Respondent at 4, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-
1717).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 11 S. Ct. at 2385 (citing 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(Letts, J., dissenting in part) (quoting 510 So. 2d 321, 322)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2384-85.
143. Id. at 2386, noting that "(t]he State concedes, and we accept for purposes of
this decision, that the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion required to justify a
seizure and that, if a seizure took place, the drugs found in Bostick's suitcase must be
[Vol. 12:615
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B. Lower Court Decisions
1. Trial Court Decision14"
Bostick moved to have the recovered cocaine suppressed in
the Circuit Court for Broward County, arguing that it had been
obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.145 Al-
though there were significant conflicting facts as noted above,
the court declined to resolve these inconsistencies. Instead, it
simply denied the motion to suppress. 140 Thereafter, Bostick
pled guilty while expressly reserving the right to appeal the de-
nial of his motion.147
2. Florida District Court of Appeal Decision1 48
A court of appeals panel affirmed the trial court decision 2-
1.141 However, it also certified the following question to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court: "May the police without articulable suspi-
cion board a bus and ask at random, for, and receive, consent to
search a passenger's luggage where they advise the passenger
suppressed as tainted fruit."). See also Brief of Respondent at 8-9, Florida v. Bostick,
111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717) (stating that [alssuming that Bostick was illegally
seized, the cocaine found during the search of his bag must be suppressed as 'fruit of the
poisonous tree.' "). The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned tree" was first illustrated
by Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). He
noted that the policy purpose of excluding illegally obtained evidence prevented its use
not only in court, but for any purpose, unless such information had been obtained from
an independent source. Id. at 392. Although Holmes did not use the specific phrase
"fruit of the poisoned tree," Silverthorne is often cited by courts as originating this con-
cept. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). The underlying prin-
cipal of this doctrine is that once the original evidence, or "tree," is tainted by the means
of obtaining it (such as by an illegal seizure), all further evidence or "fruit" derived from
that evidence is equally illegal.
144. Fla. Cir. Ct. of the 17th Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Criminal Division,
Florida. (Aug. 4, 1986) (Case No.: 85-10543CF) (unreported decision). See Writ of Cer-
tiorari to Supreme Court of Florida, Joint Appendix at 2, Bostick (No. 89-1717).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Melissa Goodman, A Long Journey, LtPE, Fall Special 1991, at 78.
148. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
149. Id. at 322. Subsequently, on facts very similar to Bostick, the Florida District
Court of Appeals found a bus passenger's consent not to have been coerced. State v.
Avery, 531 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that the defendant's
"consent to search is not per se involuntary because obtained by law enforcement officers
on board a commercial carrier such as a bus or other similar forms of transportation.").
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that he has the right to refuse consent to search?" 1 0 Since the
lower court chose not to address the issue of the contradictory
testimony in the case, the court of appeals determined that
those issues had been resolved in the State's favor.151
3. Florida Supreme Court Decision52
The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the issue as "[d]oes
an impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search
on buses during scheduled stops and question boarded passen-
gers without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining
consent to search passengers' luggage? 1 53 In a divided 4-3 opin-
ion, the court answered the question in the affirmative, and re-
versed the court of appeals decision.15'
Once again, the court resolved the conflicting testimony in
favor of the State, as being a question of fact decided by the
trial judge. 55 Nonetheless, the court held that Bostick had in
fact been seized once the officers approached him and ques-
tioned him at the back of the bus.156 The court also found that
the seizure was unconstitutional, since there was admittedly
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. 157 Therefore,
the court reasoned that even assuming Bostick had in fact vol-
untarily consented to the search of the second blue bag, that
consent was not valid since it failed to overcome the taint of the
150. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d at 322.
151. Id. (Letts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989). Bostick was the lead case for a
series of cases in which the Florida district courts had upheld consensual searches. In
State v. Avery, 531 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the District Court of Appeals
upheld consensual searches and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question:
"May consent to search be suppressed by the trial court as 'coerced' upon the sole
ground that the officer(s) boarded a bus (or other public transport) and randomly sought
consent from passengers?" Subsequent cases certifying the identical question were Serpa
v. State, 541 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) and Shaw v. State, 543 So. 2d 469 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Two other decisions that followed Avery were Mendez v. State, 434
So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) and McBride v. State, 535 So. 2d 692 (Fla.Dist. Ct.
App. 1988). The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question, as rephrased in
Bostick v. State, in the affirmative. Mendez v. State, 554 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1989).
153. 554 So. 2d at 1154.
154. Id. at 1154, 1159.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1157.
157. Id. at 1158.
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prior illegal seizure. 158
In reaching its conclusion, the Florida Supreme Court rec-
ognized that whenever there is a police-citizen encounter, there
is a conflict between two very important competing interests: the
right of the individual to be left alone and the need for law en-
forcement.159 The court noted that when there is probable cause
or reasonable suspicion that someone has committed a crime,
the scale tips in favor of the police, who then have the right,
subject to constitutional restrictions, to conduct a search or
seizure.180 The court further stated that in order to determine
just when such a search or seizure will be considered reasonable,
and therefore constitutional, police activity will be divided into
three general categories.1 61 The first category deals with arrests,
which the court noted requires a finding of probable cause.16 2
The second category involves a lesser form of seizure - one
that is short of arrest.1 63 Cases falling into this category are usu-
ally those where there is a short investigatory stop premised on
reasonable suspicion.1 64 The final category deals with consensual
encounters.16 5 Regardless of the lack of probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion, there will be no seizure where an individual
agrees without coercion to police activity.166
The court noted that in the present case, the State claimed
that this was a third category issue.167 The State's rationale was
that since Bostick consented to the search there was no Fourth
Amendment violation.1 68 Unconvinced, the court dismissed this
argument and found that this case really fell into the second cat-
egory.169 Since the State conceded that there was neither proba-
ble cause nor reasonable suspicion to question Bostick, the court
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1155.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1156.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
1992]
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looked to the Mendenhall definition of when a seizure occurs. 170
In turning its attention to whether "a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave, 111 the court
proceeded to explore what a reasonable bus passenger in Bos-
tick's situation would have believed.17 2 The court relied heavily
on the fact that Bostick was seated at the very end of the bus,
and that his only available exit was, at the very least, partially
blocked by the officers.178 Furthermore, the court argued that
even if Bostick had chosen to get up and walk past the officers,
he could not be realistically expected to leave the bus.'7 4 If he
abandoned the bus, he would miss his destination, forfeit his bus
fare, and find himself stranded in a strange city.
The Court analogized the case to Alvarez v. State,7 5 an-
other Florida case with striking similarities to Bostick.176 In Al-
varez, the defendant was approached in his sleeping car on a
passenger train that was about to depart. 77 The court looked to
see if a seizure had occurred within the Mendenhall definition,
and found that it had. 78 Since Alvarez was not approached in a
public terminal as the Mendenhall test presumed, he did not
have the realistic option of leaving.17 9 Rather, his only other
choice was to be aggressive and ask the officers to leave. 80
The Bostick court also turned its attention to another
Broward County seizure case,"8 ' State v. Kerwick.8"2 In Kerwick,
the court found a seizure to have occurred under circumstances
where police officers approached the defendant while she was
170. Id. at 1157. See also supra part I.B.2.
171. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544. See also supra part ll.B.2.
172. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 515 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
176. 554 So. 2d at 1157. Both Alvarez and Bostick arose on facts questioning
whether a seizure had occurred within close confines.
177. Id. at 287-88. Of added interest is the fact that Officer Joseph Nutt, one of the
officers in Alvarez, was also one of the two officers in Bostick. See 515 So.2d at 287 and
Brief of Respondent at 4, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
178. 515 So. 2d at 289.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158.
182. 512 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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seated in a parked car. 183 The officers positioned themselves by
the car door, thereby blocking any possible exit.1 8 '
The Bostick court was particularly swayed by the Kerwick
majority's frightening prediction of a future reminiscent of the
days of Hitler and Stalin, where the average American citizen
will be forced to produce papers in order to pass on the
streets.8 s Accordingly, the Bostick court concluded that while
no arrest initially occurred, Bostick was nevertheless illegally
seized.""6 The court did not consider whether the seizure could
still be considered valid, since the State had previously stipu-
lated that it lacked any basis for suspecting any wrongdoing.1 87
Therefore, the seizure of Bostick was held to be unlawful.188
The court next addressed the issue of whether under these
circumstances Bostick's consent to search his luggage could be
considered valid.18 9 Relying on its holding in Norman v. State,18 0
the court reiterated that the only way consent could be found
valid under these circumstances is if there is "clear and convinc-
ing proof of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality suffi-
cient to dissipate the taint of prior official illegal action." 91 Hav-
ing found no such proof here, the court reasoned that the police
overstepped their authority, and held Bostick's consent to be
invalid.1 9 2
183. Id. at 347.
184. Id. at 348.
185. Id. Judge Anstead, writing for the Kerwick majority observed:
the evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days, under other flags,
when no man traveled his nation's roads or railways without fear of unwarranted
interruption, by individuals who held temporary power in the Government. The
spectre of American citizens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for identifica-
tion, travel papers - in short a raison d'etre - is foreign to any fair reading of
the Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties. This is not Hitler's Berlin,
nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist South Africa.
Id.
186. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
187. Id. at 1158.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 379 So. 2d 643, 647-48 (Fla. 1980) (finding consent to search involuntary due to
coercive circumstances).
191. Id. at 647. See also supra note 143 for a discussion of the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" doctrine.
192. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d at 1158.
1992]
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C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in a 6-3 opin-
ion,193 reversed the Florida Supreme Court decision and re-
manded the case back to the Florida courts to reconsider the
issue under the proper legal standard.1 94 The Court framed the
issue as "whether a police encounter on a bus . . .necessarily
constitutes a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment."1 98 The Court rejected what it perceived to be the Florida
Supreme Court's adoption of a "per se" rule that "working the
buses" is unconstitutional.19 a The Court focused its attention on
whether Bostick felt free to terminate the encounter with the
police.197 If he did feel free to terminate, no seizure had oc-
curred, and the encounter was purely consensual in nature. 9 ' If
he did not feel free to terminate, a finding that a seizure had
occurred would result in suppression of the cocaine as "tainted
fruit," because the State had already conceded that there was no
reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure.1 9
Justice O'Connor stated that, "a seizure does not occur sim-
ply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a
few questions." 00 Referring back to the Court's decision in
Terry v. Ohio,201 Justice O'Connor noted that such exchanges
between individuals and police officers only reach the level of a
seizure when it is clear that the citizen's liberty has been
restricted. 20 2
Unlike the Florida Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor ex-
plained that it was inappropriate to concentrate on the "free to
leave" part of the Mendenhall 203 test for seizure.04 Rather, the
emphasis should be on "the principle that those words were in-
193. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2384 (1991).
194. Id. at 2389.
195. Id. at 2386.
196. Id. at 2387.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2386.
201. See supra part I.B.1.
202. 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
203. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
204. 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
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tended to capture."2 5 She pointed out that the fact that Bostick
may not have felt "free to leave" the bus was a result of his own
choice in traveling on the bus in the first place. 0 In this regard,
she found INS v. Delgado27 to be dispositive.20 8 Her reasoning
hinged on the concept that the factory workers in Delgado, like
Bostick, found their movements limited due to their own choices
and circumstances, rather than to any police activity.20 9 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that since Bostick had no desire to leave the
bus in the first, place, whether or not he was free to leave the bus
when the polide approached him would not be a legitimate test
of the coerciveness of the encounter. 10
Instead, the majority framed the test as "whether a reasona-
ble person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or oth-
erwise terminate the encounter. 2 11 Justice O'Connor reasoned
that this was not a radical new test, but merely a reformulation
which followed from the Court's previous decisions. These deci-
sions have held that in order to qualify as a seizure, the police
must have indicated to the individual that he could not "ignore
the police presence and go about his business. 2 12
In remanding the case back to the Florida courts, Justice
O'Connor was careful to point out that the Supreme Court was
not making a conclusive finding as to whether or not a seizure
had actually occurred. 13 The Supreme Court claimed that it was
merely rejecting the Florida Supreme Court's heavy reliance on
the setting of the encounter.21"' The Court reasoned that the
cramped setting of the bus should be one of the factors to be
considered, but it should not be the entire basis for the deci-
sion.215 The Court directed that the setting of the encounter be
looked at in terms of a totality of the circumstances.21 6
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
208. 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2388.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2389.
216. Id.
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Furthermore, the Court noted that the reasonable person
test presumes the viewpoint of an innocent person.21 Justice
O'Connor concluded the opinion by reiterating that in determin-
ing whether a seizure has occurred, the totality of the circum-
stances rule applies regardless of whether the encounter tran-
spired on the street or on a bus.21s
D. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens,21 9 asserted that the majority's rationale effec-
tively bargained away the rights of individuals in return for an
effective means of fighting the war on drugs.2 20 The dissent ac-
cused the majority of overlooking one of the principal goals of
the Fourth Amendment by its willingness to sacrifice individual
liberties for what some would call the greater good.221 He
pointed out that the general warrant was indeed an effective
measure of law enforcement, yet the framers of the Constitution
nevertheless endeavored to limit its use.222 Not only did Justice
Marshall question the success of these "suspicionless police
sweep[s] of buses, 223 but he stated that the effect of this prac-
tice is that it "burdens the experience of traveling by bus with a
degree of governmental interference to which, until now, our so-
ciety has been proudly unaccustomed. '22'
The dissent further argued that, although it did not object
to the way that the majority stated the test for determining the
existence of a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, it could
217. Id. at 2388 (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574) (claiming that this presumption
ensures that the protections of the Fourth Amendment will not vary depending on the
state of mind of each citizen).
218. Id. at 2389 (noting that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court erred in adopting a per
se rule.").
219. Id.
220. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2390.
224. Id. Justice Marshall further stated that, "[t]he thought that an American can
be compelled to 'show his papers' before exercising his right to walk the streets, drive the
highways or board the trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals." Id.
(quoting from Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983) (Feld-
man, J., concurring)).
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not agree with the conclusion reached by the majority.22 5 The
dissent questioned how Justice O'Connor could doubt whether
Bostick had been seized.226 The dissent agreed that the proper
query should be, "whether a passenger who is approached dur-
ing a sweep would feel free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter, '227 However, the dissent had
no difficulty in answering "no" based on the facts in this case.228
The dissenters reasoned that under the circumstances, Bos-
tick had only two choices: he could have either remained seated
while attempting to refuse to cooperate with the officers, or he
could have physically removed himself from the presence of the
officers. 229 The dissenters indicated that neither option was par-
ticularly appealing from Bostick's viewpoint.30 If Bostick had
chosen to ignore the officers' questions, it would have been rea-
sonable to assume that the officers might have then become even
more persistent in their interrogation.23 ' Furthermore, Bostick
might have feared that his failure to cooperate would be held
against him, thereby giving the officers the reasonable suspicion
they needed to make a valid seizure.32 Additionally, Justice
Marshall explained that had Bostick pursued the second alter-
native, he would have been forced to aggressively push himself
past two armed officers, something that the average citizen is not
easily inclined to do.233
Moreover, even had Bostick felt that he would have been
allowed to leave the bus in order to avoid the presence of the
officers, Justice Marshall doubted that Bostick would actually
have done So.234 It was pointed out that the fact that the bus was
on a stopover, and due to leave the terminal at any moment
225. Id. at 2391.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2393.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. See also Brief for Respondent at 15, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382
(1991) (No. 89-1717) (pointing out that even had Bostick chosen to push past the officers
in order to exit the bus, he would likely have still found himself trapped, since most
people lack the requisite knowledge to open a closed bus door).
234. 111 S. Ct. at 2393-94.
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added to the coercive element of the encounter.235 Additionally,
the majority's "blame the victim" approach2 3 6 was condemned as
a means of singling out interstate bus travelers, when less intru-
sive means are available to accomplish the same goal.237 As an
example, Justice Marshall noted that the police were always al-
lowed to approach bus passengers where they had reasonable
suspicion.8 8 Where no basis for suspicion existed, there was still
nothing to stop the police from advising the passengers that
they had a right to refuse to be questioned.239
E. On Remand: Bostick v. Florida2 40
Almost six months after the United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded Florida v. Bostick241 back to the Florida
Supreme Court to reconsider the issue under the proper test for
seizure, the Florida court responded with an approximately 100-
word ruling.2 42 In its decision, the court held, by a vote of 4-3,
that the district court opinion, upholding the trial court's deci-
sion to deny Bostick's motion to suppress, should be
approved. 4 3
Judge Barkett, writing for the dissent, argued that the trial
court had made no express findings of fact.244 Therefore, even
though the court was no longer permitted to consider bus
searches as "per se" unreasonable, the court was not precluded
from finding that the particular facts of the case required a find-
ing that a seizure had occurred. 45 While admitting that there
are many police encounter situations where a reasonable person
could conclude that he is free to terminate the encounter, Judge
Barkett felt that under the facts of this case,
235. Id.
236. See supra note 60.
237. 111 S. Ct. at 2394.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2394-95.
240. 593 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1992).
241. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382.
242. 593 So. 2d at 495.
243. Id.
244. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
245. Id. See infra notes 352-53 and accompanying text (explaining that the Florida
state constitution mandates that it must follow decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on
Fourth Amendment issues).
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[tihis was not a casual encounter on a street corner where a rea-
sonable person might feel free to treat the police like an encoun-
ter with any other citizen .... [T]hus I could find that under the
totality of the circumstances presented in this case, Bostick" 'was
not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter. 240
IV. Analysis
A. The United States Supreme Court's Dilemma: Balancing
Individual Liberty Against Efficient Law Enforcement
It is undisputed that our country is currently facing a drug
crisis that has caused law enforcement agents to mount a "war
on drugs. 24 7 It is also understandable that the Supreme Court
has no desire to tie the hands of law enforcement authorities in
this matter.248 Therefore, the Court is always faced with a deli-
cate balancing act between the rights of individuals and the
need for effective law enforcement.2 4
Over the past few years, the Court appears to have made a
conscious effort to tip the scales in favor of police efficiency in
an effort to focus on the "common good. '250 Beginning with its
decision in Terry, the Court allowed for brief detainments with-
246. 593 So. 2d at 495-46, (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389).
247. 111 S. Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall began his dissent
by stating that "[olur Nation, we are told, is engaged in a 'war on drugs."' See also
Stanley Sporkin, Remark: Address by the Honorable Stanley Sporkin at the American
University Law Review Annual Dinner, 41 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 5 (1991).
248. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 370, 395 (explaining how the Court
is often torn between the dilemma of upholding Fourth Amendment law and the desire
to avoid appearing to "police the police").
249. Justice O'Connor acknowledged the importance of maintaining such a balance
by noting that in the "war on drugs," it remains necessary to "respect the rights of indi-
viduals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime."
111 S. Ct. at 2389. In this regard, Justice Brennan pointed out that even where it later
becomes evident that the defendant was, in fact, "guilty" of the crime, "such post hoc
rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan subsequently pointed out that the Court may sometimes be influenced by a
"distaste" for drug activity. See Florida v. Reilly, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment does not turn on
whether the search reveals legal or illegal activity).
250. See supra parts 11.B.1-3. However, just how "efficient" these random bus
searches are is highly questionable. See generally United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707,
710 (1990) (100 sweeps resulting in only 15 seizures and seven arrests).
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out the existence of probable cause. 51 Continuing with Menden-
hall and Royer, even a lack of reasonable suspicion was found
not to cause a consensual encounter2 52 to rise to the level of a
seizure.25 Thus, the Court had paved the way for a very narrow
definition of a seizure.254 Such a narrow definition had the effect
of ensuring that now there would be a greater number of situa-
tions in which encounters would not be characterized as seizures
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Despite warnings to avoid ex-
panding the concept of consensual encounters, it is clear that
the Court in Bostick has limited the protection of the Fourth
Amendment far beyond what these original rulings had in-
tended.25 The problem with doing so is that Fourth Amend-
ment protection was never designed to be contingent on the se-
verity of the particular evil facing society. 56
In Bostick, the Court appeared to face the seizure dilemma
in the context of a two-part analysis. The Court decided to first
address the issue of whether Bostick had been seized.2 5
7 If it
found that he had not been seized, the Court indicated that the
next step would be to look at whether Bostick had freely con-
sented to the search of his bags. 5
251. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (allowing limited stop and search for weapons
based on reasonable suspicion).
252. The term "consensual encounter," as used in this article, denotes a police-citi-
zen encounter wherein the police, with neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion,
randomly approach a citizen.
253. See supra parts H.B.2-3.
254. See supra parts I.B.2-3.
255. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510-12 (1983), (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result) (noting that the Terry rationale was intended to be for the very limited purpose
of protecting the officer while he goes about his investigation, and that to extend it to
enable the officer to discover evidence of a crime was to "swallow'the general rule that
Fourth Amendment seizures [and searches] are 'reasonable' only if based on probable
cause.") (alteration in the original).
256. See Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a Police
Squad Car, 70 B.U. L. REV. 543, 552 (1990) (book review). Professor Maclin notes that
while police activity is often focused on dealing with a particular law enforcement prob-
lem, and may in fact be the most efficient way to correct such a problem, this was not
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also 111 S. Ct. at 2389 (J. Marshall,
dissenting) (stating that "the effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique is not proof of
its constitutionality.").
257. 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
258. Id. at 2388.
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B. Staying True to the Fourth Amendment
Is the Supreme Court's test for determining whether a
seizure has occurred consistent with Fourth Amendment guide-
lines? The Court does not construe every encounter between the
police and an individual as rising to the level of a seizure in the
first place.29 The Court speculates that where a "reasonable
person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooper-
ate," there is no need for the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment.260 Several arguments have been made in support of this
position. To begin with, it would be unfair to argue that it is
acceptable for a stranger to approach an individual on the street,
while making it unacceptable if that same stranger is dressed in
a police uniform.261 Therefore, so long as there is no intimidation
on the part of the police, the encounter will not likely be classi-
fied as a seizure.
Secondly, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not pro-
hibit all encounters between police officers and citizens; only un-
reasonable encounters.2 2 However, the inquiry cannot end here,
because there must be a determination as to when the encounter
becomes unreasonable. That is, at what point does an encounter
under the Fourth Amendment become a seizure, requiring at
least a showing of reasonable suspicion to justify it?
C. Defining the Reasonable Person
An examination of whether Fourth Amendment protection
is implicated is heavily dependent on whether the police-citizen
encounter is intimidating enough to qualify as a seizure. Pin-
pointing the exact moment when such an encounter crosses the
line from reasonable to unreasonable can be perplexing.2 3 It is
259. 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
260. Id. at 2384. The Court further explained that "[t]he encounter will not trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." Id. at 2386.
261. See Wayne LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Per-
son to Resolve Warrants, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 417, 422
n.29 (1984). See generally Maclin, supra note 21.
262. "The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ... but upon probable cause ..... U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
(emphasis added).
263. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (stating that "[wle do not suggest that there
is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for
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entirely possible to have two identical scenarios where one per-
son would feel intimidated, yet the other would not. Yet, given
such instances, it would be grossly unfair to require law enforce-
ment officers to engage in on-the-spot guesswork as to what is
going on inside the mind of each individual approached.26 4
Hence, the objective "reasonable person" test emerges and a
subjective test based on the actual individual involved is
discounted. 6 5
Admittedly, this eliminates the extremes of both the overly
sensitive person who might feel coerced by merely spotting a po-
lice officer two blocks away, as well as the thick-skinned individ-
ual who doesn't feel intimidated until he is given an order at
gunpoint. Nevertheless, even this objective test leaves open the
question of influences on individual behaviors.266
determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop.").
264. See LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 9.2(h), at 407-08 (explaining that the "reasona-
ble person" standard does not depend upon the suspect's subjective viewpoint, since that
would require the officer to be able to read the suspect's mind. Furthermore, "[a] given
set of circumstances, for example, might operate quite differently upon a person with a
'guilty mind' as compared to an'innocent person.' ").
265. LaFave, supra note 261, at 424-25 (stating that "the confrontation is a seizure
only if the officer adds to those inherent pressures [referring to the moral and social
pressure to cooperate with police] by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that ac-
cepted in social intercourse. The critical inquiry is whether the policeman, even if mak-
ing inquiries a private citizen would not, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner
which would be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two ordinary
citizens.").
266. For example, an added consideration of a public encounter is the element of
peer pressure. See Bruce Fein, Bloated Police Powers, THE WASHINGTON TIMEs, June 25,
1991, at GI (commenting on the Bostick majority's indifference to the fear of "social
stigmatization" as "profoundly disturbing"). Mr. Fein invites the reader to consider the
following scenario:
At the Capital Centre, a rock concert attracts 5,000 patrons .... Before the con-
cert commences, the police deliver the following message over the public address
system: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is your local police force. We are dedicated to
making our society free of the twin scourges of drugs and guns. We welcome your
assistance in these endeavors because curbing illegal drug use or handgun abuse
cannot be achieved by the police alone. We require the cooperation of the commu-
nity. Please lend us your ears for a moment. You enjoy a constitutional right
under the Fourth Amendment to decline cooperation in the fight against drugs
and firearms. But we would be forever thankful if you would decline to assert that
right this evening as a symbol of your abhorrence of illegal drug or gun possession,
and of your desire that this evening be a drug-free and gun-free event. We have no
reason to believe any of you in the Capital Centre is guilty of drug or firearm
crimes. During the next 15 to 20 minutes, unarmed police officers will be seeking
your consent to search your person and belongings. Those who wish to consent,
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/4
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One question that the Court believes needs to be considered
is whether the reasonable person is one who is innocent or
guilty? 2 7 Should that even matter? Although our society claims
to stand behind the proposition that all individuals are "inno-
cent until proven guilty," we risk ignoring this precept by mak-
ing that determination initially. Although Justice O'Connor has
declared that the courts are to assume the "innocent person"
perspective in deciding this issue, 68 that does not necessarily in-
fluence the outcome of the reasonable person determination. On
the one hand, a "guilty" person may decide to cooperate in order
to throw off the police. Yet at the same time, an "innocent" per-
son may be reluctant to offer resistance for fear of appearing
guilty. Surely there cannot be many average innocent citizens
who would feel comfortable refusing a police officer's request.269
Since the distinction between these two mindsets can often be
blurry, it might be best to avoid such differentiation in the first
place.
Since the Court has found that the police need not inform
the party that he or she has the right to refuse any requests,27
the average citizen is unlikely to be aware that this right to re-
fuse to cooperate even exists. Even if one further assumes a hy-
pothetical encounter with a citizen who just happens to have re-
please remain seated to signify your honorable cooperation with law enforcement.
Those who wish to assert their constitutional right to refuse consent, please de-
scend to the Capital Centre floor and stand within one of the two circles that
feature either a scarlet D or G. We will respect your right of noncooperation with
the noble effort to combat drug and gun abuses."
When the police sermonizing concludes, less than a handful remove them-
selves to the scarlet D or G, and they are booed by the crowd. The police en masse
search the patrons who remain seated and discover scores illegally possessed of
drugs or firearms.
Id.
267. LAFAvE, supra note 107, at 411 n.240 (citing Login v. State, 394 So.2d 183 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding the reasonable person standard to be "innocent of any
crime"). LaFave noted that "[t]his might well be a step in the right direction." Id.
268. 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
269. LAFAvE, supra note 107, at 410 (quoting from Illinois Migrant Council v. Pil-
liod, 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D.Il1. 1975) (stating that "[i]mplicit in the introduction of the
[officer] and the initial questioning is a show of authority to which the average person
encountered will feel obliged to stop and respond. Few will feel that they can walk away
or refuse to answer.").
270. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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cently read Schneckloth,7 1 it is highly questionable whether
such a person would truly feel that he or she could terminate the
encounter without drawing additional suspicion. Considering
that the natural instinct of most people is to try to avoid an
unpleasant confrontation with the police, the usual response of a
reasonable person is likely to be that they will go along with any
request in order to avoid finding themselves in an even greater
predicament.2 2 Even though the Court has stated as its policy
that the refusal of a party to cooperate cannot be used as justifi-
able grounds for reasonable suspicion,2 7 3 there is no guarantee
that this always works in practice. Police officers are likely to
assume that one has something to hide if he or she declines to
cooperate, and may use that as the basis for continued surveil-
lance. 74 Moreover, there is always the possibility that the of-
ficers will deliberately try to provoke resistance and use it as a
means of justifying reasonable suspicion.75
In addition to mandating that the reasonable person be in-
nocent, the Court implicitly requires that this mythical reasona-
ble person also be knowledgeable and assertive - in other
words, just like the Supreme Court Justices.17 Such an implica-
271. Id. (holding that consent is valid where it is given voluntarily, regardless of
whether party is informed of right to refuse such consent).
272. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[t]he citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers under-
take or to resist at risk of arrest of (sic] immediate violence.").
273. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct at 2387 (stating that "(w]e have consistently held
that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
justification needed for a detention or seizure.").
274. See generally Stuart Taylor, Jr., Perspectives; Taking Issue; When Do Tough
Cop Tactics Become Outright Coercion?, CONNECTICUT LAW TRMUNE, March 11, 1991, at
22 (stating that "(a]t best, travelers who exercise their theoretical right not to be
searched are sure to become instant suspects. Police will strain to detect or invent signs
of nervousness, which can then be bootstrapped into a 'reasonable suspicion' and used to
justify an involuntary search if their quarry cannot be bullied into 'consenting.' Some
officers have said they phone ahead to suggest further scrutiny of uncooperative sorts at
the next stop.").
275. See Herman Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of
the Police), 58 J. CRI.. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433. 453 n.146 (1967) (explaining that police
may encourage resistance during detention). See also infra part IV.E.
276. Taylor, supra note 274. Mr. Taylor hypothesized a perfect encounter that the
Justices may have in mind.
First officer (with elaborate courtesy): "Excuse us, my dear fellow, but it would
seem drug couriers are about, and we were wondering whether you might be one of
them. Would you be so good as to show us your ticket and ID?"
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tion is arguably, at best, unrealistic. When was the last time one
of the Justices traveled by bus?2 " Moreover, assuming that such
a mythical ideal citizen who asserts his right to be left alone is
approached by the police, how different would his or her reac-
tion be from the average, uninformed, unaggressive citizen? It is
doubtful that he would feel comfortable standing up to author-
ity. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court chooses to equate pres-
sured submission with a finding of no seizure, how can it say
with a straight face that the reasonable person would likely feel
free to terminate the encounter?
2 78
One possible explanation is that the Court does not really
believe the scenario of a John or Jane Q. Public feeling perfectly
comfortable with telling the police to "take a hike. ' 27 Neverthe-
less, the Court hides behind the illusion in order to justify its
Second officer (casually placing hand on pistol): "And while you're about it,
would you mind handing over that blue bag there so we can search it for drugs?"
Passenger: "Sorry, gents, but I'm trying to get some rest."
First officer: "Pretty please?"
Passenger: "No way. I don't appreciate being treated like a criminal, I don't
want anyone snooping through my toilet kit, and they haven't repealed the Fourth
Amendment yet. So kindly move along, or I'll be constrained to go hide in the
bathroom."
Second Officer: "Well partner, I guess we'd better do what the man says. You
remember Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1, 27."
First Officer: "Righto. See also Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 502 (plurality
opinion). Ever so sorry to have inconvenienced you, sir. Godspeed."
Id.
277. See generally The Bus Stops Here; The Bottom Line on the Fourth Amend-
ment Must Ask Whether Searches are Cost-Effective, as well as Constitutional, AMEm-
CAN LAWYER MEDIA, L.P. THE RECORDER, Nov. 7, 1991, at 6 (stating that "[tjo put it
another way, there are probably not too many constitutional scholars or civil rights law-
yers traveling on buses similar to the one on which Bostick was riding when approached
by the Broward County Sheriff's Department deputies."). See also James R. Peterson,
Power Play: The New Supreme Court's War on Freedom, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1991, at 49
(noting that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor probably hadn't been on a bus in decades).
278. See Maclin, supra note 256, at 577 (stating that "[i]n the real world, people are
afraid of the power of the police and want to minimize the chances of that power being
asserted over them. People do not assert their rights because they know the police are
not always respectful of those rights."). See also LAFAvE, supra note 107, at 411 (stating
"[t]hus, if the ultimate issue is perceived as being whether the suspect 'would feel free to
walk away,' then virtually all police encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a
Fourth Amendment seizure.") (citations and footnotes omitted).
279. Nor is it plausible that the Court really feels that "the typical police-citizen
encounter is the equivalent of two old friends greeting each other on the street corner."
Maclin, supra note 21, at 1301.
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position on what it sees as a way to solve a very serious prob-
lem. 28 0 Furthermore, one could believe that even though such an
encounter may result in inconvenience or embarrassment, caus-
ing the average citizen to yield to authority, such embarrassment
or inconvenience does not necessarily make the encounter a
seizure. After all, to some extent, we as a society depend on
these subtle pressures in order to maintain law and order.81
Such social and moral pressures on one's conscience are, there-
fore, not an entirely unwelcome occurrence. However, it cheap-
ens the value of our Fourth Amendment rights if we are willing
to trade off some minor intrusions in order to jail more drug
traffickers. 28 2 The Fourth Amendment does not state that citi-
zens are only to be free from major intrusions; once freedom has
been restricted or privacy invaded, it should be a seizure, no
matter how large or small.
D. Free to Leave versus Free to Terminate the Encounter
In Bostick, the Supreme Court modified the Mendenhall
test to encompass when a reasonable person would feel free to
"terminate the encounter," rather than only feeling "free to
280. Id.
281. Id. (stating that "the standard is actually a 'policy' decision that the police
should be allowed to rely on the moral and instinctive pressure to cooperate inherent in
[police-citizen] encounters by not treating them as 'seizures' for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.") (citing Yale Kamisar) (emphasis in original). Cf. LaFave, supra note 261, at 424,
noting that "[i]f 'the moral and instinctive pressures to cooperate are in general sound
and may be relied on by the police,' then a street encounter does not amount to a fourth
amendment seizure merely because of those pressures - that is, merely because the
other party to the encounter is known to be a policeman."
282. Ira Glasser, director of the American Civil Liberties Union and William
Kunstler, civil rights attorney, discussed this issue on the Pozner & Donahue show. They
speculated that Americans are supportive of aggressive police action because they are
frightened of the increase in crime, and because they perceive that "others" will be af-
fected. See Pozner & Donahue (Multimedia Entertainment television broadcast, Nov. 1,
1991). Mr. Glasser stated:
when somebody breaks down the door of - of a black person living in a project
because they think that there are drugs inside, whether they're right or not and
whether they have violated the privacy of an innocent ... party or not, people
think, 'Oh well, that's them. It's not me. I'm not at danger. My children are not at
danger.' The problem with rights is that you don't know they're gone until they're
gone.
Id. at 6.
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leave. ' 283 While Justice O'Connor claims that this breaks no new
ground,2 ' that is not necessarily the situation. Even though
these two phrases may sound similar on the surface, in practice
they denote two distinct types of behavior. When an individual
is approached by police officers in an open public forum, that
individual need only continue on his original path in order to
escape the officers.
Contrast this with an individual who finds himself isolated
within the small confines of a bus seat. Even Justice O'Connor
agreed that the "free to leave" test was inappropriate in that
instance, and under those circumstances, "the degree to which a
reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an
accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter."2 5 In-
stead, the proper test is proclaimed to be whether the person
felt "free to terminate the encounter. '288 By changing the rules
of the game to fit the situation, Justice O'Connor advances a
new test that purports to simply be a reformulation from prior
cases.287 However, by changing the test, Justice O'Connor actu-
ally adds a new hurdle. Now, instead of continuing on one's way
under a "free to leave" approach, the individual is expected to
boldly inform the police officers standing over him or her that
they should leave, in order to "terminate the encounter." As-
suming that the officers do not leave, at least right away, it can
easily become a battle of nerves to see who will break down first.
Few would question who would win such a battle. Since the
Court has already stated its belief that police officers have the
same right as other citizens to approach individuals in public
places and initiate conversations, it is highly plausible that the
same Court would find no reason why the officers cannot con-
tinue to stand in the aisle of a public bus.88
283. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated that while he agreed that the appro-
priate test should be whether Bostick was "free to terminate the encounter," he would
find that Bostick was, in fact, not free to do so. Id. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 2387.
288. See generally Brief of Respondent at 16, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382
(1991) (No. 89-1717) (stating that "[t]his argument [that respondent was still free to
terminate the encounter] fails to recognize that, so long as the individual and the police
remain in close proximity to each other within a confined space, the encounter cannot be
1992]
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What is the person to do now? Pretend to go to sleep? De-
velop a sudden case of deafness? As hard as it is for the average
citizen to walk away from a police encounter, it is twice as diffi-
cult for those with a healthy mixture of respect and fear to de-
mand to be left alone. By ignoring this reality, the majority gives
the average citizen far more credit for backbone than he or she
deserves and ends up shortchanging all of society.
E. The Consequences of Attempting to Terminate an
Encounter
Just as the Court has noted that police officers are free to
approach citizens,'" the Court has also indicated that citizens
have an equal right to ignore such advances. 90 Nevertheless, a
judicial pronouncement from the bench is no guarantee that
such rights will be protected on the streets. As previously noted,
the average citizen will be inclined to acknowledge the presence
of an officer and will endeavor to cooperate with him.291 How-
ever, should an individual choose to walk away or terminate the
encounter, what can he realistically expect?
If he was out walking in Texas prior to 1979, he might ex-
pect to get arrested for refusing to identify himself in response
to a police request.292 If he was a law student at Tulane in New
Orleans in the mid-sixties, and decided that he was both knowl-
edgeable and confident enough about his ability to refuse the
officers' requests, he would find himself charged with vagrancy,
resisting an officer, reviling the police, and disturbing the peace
considered truly over. And a reasonable person would not have felt free to simply stone-
wall the officers' inquiries, because the officers' conduct gave substantial reason for ques-
tion about how the officers would respond.").
289. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (stating that
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets.").
290. Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "ordinarily the person ad-
dressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away"); see also Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (pointing out that an individual who is approached by a
police officer "need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen
to the questions at all and may go on his way.").
291. See supra note 269.
292. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (holding that the application of the statute
used to detain appellant was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment
where police officers had no reasonable suspicion).
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by assaulting the police officers. 93 It is no small wonder that the
average citizen will choose to submit to police questioning rather
than find himself faced with unpleasant consequences. 294
A more recent example of an attempt to terminate an en-
counter is U.S. v. Wilson.9 Wilson was approached by three
Drug Enforcement Agency officers upon his arrival at National
Airport. 96 At first he agreed to speak with the officers. 97 He
produced identification and told the officers were he was from.9
In response to further questioning, Wilson stated that he was
not carrying any guns and permitted his bag to be searched and
his person frisked.2 99 However, when Wilson was asked for per-
mission to search two coats that he was holding, he sought to
terminate the encounter.300 Wilson subsequently made at least
four attempts to leave the officers, but they persisted in follow-
ing alongside of him and pressuring him to accede to their re-
quest.301 When Wilson finally gave in, a search of one of the
coats revealed cocaine and Wilson was arrested.3 02
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first found that
the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to question Wilson. 3
293. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968) (dismissing writ of
certiorari where issue was whether individual may properly resist cooperating with police
officers). Police officers had stopped a law student on his way for a snack and requested
identification. The student told police that he was a law student and gave them his name
and address, but stated that his identification was at home. When he was then asked to
remove his jacket in order to check for a tattoo (which was supposedly on the left arm of
a murder suspect the police were looking for) the student refused. He then attempted to
walk away from the officers three times, but was subsequently arrested. Id. at 600-01.
294. See Maclin, supra note 256, at 574, 577. In addition, a Professor of Criminal
Procedure has stated that she would feel that any failure on her part to cooperate, no
matter how justified, might only result in police harassment. One way or the other, the
police would end up searching what it was they came to search, and all she would have to
show for her efforts would be that she would be unreasonably delayed, publicly humili-
ated, or even worse - arrested. Telephone Interview with Barbara Salken, Professor of
Law, Pace University School of Law (Sept. 23, 1991).
295. 953 F.2d 116 (1991).
296. Id. at 118.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 123.
302. Id. at 119.
303. Id. at 120.
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The court did find that this was a consensual encounter.3 0 ' How-
ever, the court held that the consensual nature of the encounter
ended when Wilson made it clear that he wished to be left alone,
and that the persistent police harassment caused Wilson to be
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.305 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court noted that the "freedom to leave means fun-
damentally the freedom to break off contact, in which case of-
ficers must, in the absence of objective justification, leave the
passenger alone. 3 0 6 Under the facts of Wilson, the court found
that the actions of the police clearly indicated that a reasonable
person was not "free to leave. 30 7 The court went on to hypothe-
size that had Bostick been faced with police officers arguing with
him while Bostick continued to tell them to leave, the courts in
that case might have found that Bostick had been seized. 08 In
the end, it is comforting to note that the court did indeed find
an illegal seizure to have occurred under these circumstances.
However, this may be small consolation to the individual who
finds himself arrested and facing the possibility of a long court
battle after exerting his right to terminate an encounter.
Another possible concern of many citizens might be that
any attempt to terminate the encounter will result in providing
the officers with the reasonable suspicion required for a valid
seizure. The judicial pronouncement on this issue is otherwise,309
but as previously noted, reality can often turn the Court's direc-
tives into fiction.310 On the other hand, an argument could be
made that should such a refusal to cooperate escalate to the
level of a detainment, this would be evidence that the individual
was never truly free to leave in the first place, and that an illegal
seizure had indeed occurred.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 123.
306. Id. at 122 (quoting from United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 712 (4th Cir.
1990). cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895 (1991).
307. Id. The court also stated that "[d]espite his best efforts, Wilson was unable to
'terminate the encounter,' 'to ignore the police presence and go about his business,' or to
'go on his way."' Id.
308. Id.
309. See supra note 273.
310. See supra notes 274-75.
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F. Setting The Scene: The Role Location Plays
The Court also goes to great lengths to play the "blame the
victim" game.311 In answer to those who would point out that
the cramped setting of the bus seat should be dispositive in ap-
plying the Mendenhall "free to leave" test, the Court responds
that this confinement was a "natural result of his [Bostick's] de-
cision to take the bus."312 However, as Justice Marshall points
out in the dissent, Bostick's decision to voluntarily confine him-
self does not cause him to waive his right to be free from
seizure. 3  The majority states that the voluntary confinement
aspect is a settled point of law, since the facts are similar to
those in INS v. Delgado, where the court held that the factory
workers were not truly free to leave due to their own decision to
retain employment.1 4
However, the Court fails to point out the differences that
distinguish the facts of Bostick from those of Delgado. The fac-
tory workers in Delgado could take advantage of a larger area in
which to move around in.3 1 5 Unlike being partially blocked in
the last seat of a bus, these workers were still free to move
around within the factory quarters, and could probably have ex-
cused themselves to go to the bathroom.
How important should the location of the encounter be in
determining whether a person has been seized? The Court re-
jected the Florida Supreme Court's finding of a seizure and
stated that the Florida court had incorrectly relied on a "per se"
test that all such bus encounters are, by definition, seizures.3 16
As part of its rationalization for reversing and remanding this
case back to the Florida courts, the majority stated that Bostick
must be re-analyzed in the context of the totality of the circum-
stances. 317 The problem is that the Florida Supreme Court never
really adopted this "per se" rule. Instead, the court had ex-
311. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "the majority
blames respondent for his own sensation of constraint."). See also supra note 60.
312. 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
313. Id. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
314. 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (finding INS v. Delgado dispositive as indicating no seizure
where the individual's lack of freedom to leave is due to factors beyond police control).
315. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
316. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
317. Id. at 2388.
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amined all the facts, and found that the location of the encoun-
ter weighed very heavily in its decision.1 8
When looked at from the point of view of the police officers,
it becomes clear just how important a role location can play in
an encounter.319 Since the officers in Bostick readily admitted
that they lacked any basis on which to suspect individual bus
passengers of wrongdoing, there appeared to be no sound reason
to enter the bus in the first place.320 Clearly, it would have been
just as easy for the officers to station themselves in the bus ter-
minal near the entrance to the bus, and invite passengers to talk
to them either prior to boarding, or upon disembarking from the
bus. This practice would certainly have the advantage of fully
complying with the spirit of the Mendenhall seizure test.2 ' Un-
fortunately, from the point of view of law enforcement, such tac-
318. Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989) (stating that "ft]here also is
no doubt that the setting in which the challenged police conduct occurs may provide
strong evidence of a 'seizure.' ").
319. See generally Brief for Respondent at 11-12, n.9, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct.
2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
The Unites States [Amicus Brief of the United States] ignores the fact that the
officers purposefully chose to question persons who were already seated on a bus
that was about to depart - as opposed, for example to persons who were waiting
in bus stations or disembarking from buses - presumably because they knew
that such persons would be constrained by time and money, among other con-
cerns, from walking away from the encounter.
Id. See also id. at 13 n.12 (stating that "[t]he United States' [Amicus Brief of the United
States) argument entirely ignores the fact that the officers deliberately decided to act on
this captive audience, presumably because they believed that their inquiries would be
more fruitful if conducted in the restrictive confines of the bus rather than, for example,
in the bus station.").
320. Bostiek 111 S. Ct. at 2386 (noting that "[t]he State concedes, and we accept for
purposes of this decision, that the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion required to
justify a seizure and that, if a seizure took place, the drugs found in Bostick's suitcase
must be suppressed as tainted fruit."). See United States v. Madison, 936 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1990) (officers suspected defendant in open bus terminal, but waited until he
boarded the bus before approaching him). In addition, the very fact that police concen-
trate on boarding buses to a far greater extent than boarding airplanes is likely a conse-
quence of the perceived status of the individuals using these different modes of transpor-
tation. See Jason DeParle, Some Take the High Road, Some the Bus, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec.
25, 1991 at 1 (stating that "[t]he distance between the croissant counter at National
Airport outside Washington and the Burger King inside the city's bus station is one
more measure of class differences in America and the routine discomforts endured by
those of modest means.").
321. Such an alternative would allow citizens to truly be "free to leave" as well as to
"terminate the encounter" by continuing on their way without feeling trapped.
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tics would eliminate the inherent advantage of having a captive
audience.322
If the Court continues to advocate the view that an encoun-
ter at the back of a bus is no more coercive than an encounter in
an open terminal, one can easily envision this philosophy ex-
tending to other close-quarters encounters. Will we soon see in-
vestigative stops of seated movie theater patrons and restaurant
diners?323 Before this image is disregarded as being pure hyste-
ria, it should be noted that the Americans for Effective Law En-
forcement, Inc., a pro-law enforcement organization, submitted a
brief in support of Bostick, in which it stated very similar
concerns.
3 24
G. Consent
Once the issue of seizure is dealt with, the matter is not nec-
essarily put to rest. Upon a finding that the defendant in a
search and seizure case has not been seized for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes, the court must next examine whether the con-
322. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
323. Along the same line of thinking, Professor Maclin theorized that using the Del-
gado "blame the victim" approach,
there would presumably be no seizure if police officers questioned subway passen-
gers on a train that was momentarily stopped at a station while other officers
positioned themselves in front of the train's doors. Using Justice Rehnquist's anal-
ysis, it can be argued that the riders in a subway car are inherently restricted in
their movements, not by the actions of the police officers, but by their choice of
travel. If the subway riders had wanted true freedom from restraint, they should
have walked or driven automobiles.
See Maclin, supra note 21, at 1305.
324. Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., in
Qualified Support of Affirmance of the Decision Below at 9, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct.
2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717) (stating that "(w]e are concerned, however, that if the prac-
tices employed by the law enforcement officers in the present case are condoned, similar
practices would eventually extend to schoolrooms, places of entertainment, offices and
other workplaces."). See also Taylor, supra note 274, stating:
The Scalia approach [of seeing the situation as a mere consequence of the party's
choice of location] would apparently allow drug-war-crazed police to take their
dragnets into airplanes, restaurants, bars, classrooms, public restrooms - ran-
domly knocking on toilet-stall doors, announcing themselves, asking occupants if
they'd mind opening up to answer a few questions and to hand over their bags for
inspection. So what if the occupant feels a bit cornered? She entered that toilet
stall voluntarily, Scalia might say. And besides, Rehnquist might add, what's an
officer on the toilet-stall beat supposed to do?
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sent to search was valid. 25 Under the Schneckloth totality of
the circumstances test,3 26 the failure of police to advise the sus-
pect of his right to refuse consent to the search is merely one
factor to be considered.32 7 Of utmost importance is that the con-
sent be voluntarily given, rather than coerced.3 28 However, fo-
cusing on the voluntariness of the consent can be problematic.
Should consent that results from a mixture of fear and respect
for authority be presumed coerced? Generally, it is not.32 9 Like-
wise, the fact that a suspect carrying contraband nevertheless
gives consent in the hopes of appearing innocent is often not
considered to be the result of duress. 30 However, should the
consent derive from actual coercion on the part of the officers,
such consent would not be voluntary, and any evidence resulting
from such a search would have to be suppressed. Therefore, in a
case such as Bostick, in order for the government to prevail in
the admission of any contraband discovered, it must overcome
two hurdles: 1) it must prove that the suspect was not illegally
seized when approached for permission to search,331 and 2) it
must prove that any consent to search was the product of free
will.
3 3 2
325. See supra part I.C.
326. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
327. See discussion supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
328. See generally LAFAvE, supra note 107, § 8.1(a) (providing background informa-
tion on the nature and scope of consent).
329. See LAFAvE, supra note 107, at 157 n.31 (citing People v. Lumpkin, 64 Mich.
App. 123 (1975) where the court rejected the defendant's argument that his consent was
not voluntary due to his fear that trouble might result from his refusal). See also
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234 n.15 (stating that "[w]e found nothing constitutionally sus-
pect in the subjective forces that impelled the spouse to cooperate with the police.
Among these are the simple but often powerful convention of openness and honesty, the
fear that secretive behavior will intensify suspicion, and the uncertainty as to what
course is most likely to be helpful to the absent spouse.") (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).
330. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-16, Florida v.
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717) (stating that "[c]onsent that is given fool-
ishly may nevertheless be given freely. What matters is whether, in light of all the cir-
cumstances, the defendant's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determina-
tion critically impaired.' ").
331. 111 S. Ct. at 2386 (noting that due to the admitted lack of reasonable suspicion
needed to justify a seizure, if a seizure is found to have occurred, any drugs subsequently
discovered are tainted fruit).
332. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. On the other hand, should the sus-
pect be found to have been seized, any subsequent consent to a search will usually not
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Accordingly, even though the Supreme Court strongly sug-
gested that the facts of Bostick disclosed no evidence of a
seizure, and the Florida Supreme Court has since agreed, there
remains a missing element of analysis. The Florida Supreme
Court decision on remand failed to examine whether Bostick's
consent to search his bag was freely given. 3 In light of the find-
ing of a Federal circuit court that the Bostick fact scenario con-
tained such coercive components as the bold boarding of a bus
during a stop-over, raid jackets, weapon display, and demands
for identification, 3s' it appears evident that Bostick's consent
was the result of duress, and should accordingly have been held
invalid s.3 3 5
G. Aftermath
What then, did Justice O'Connor hope to accomplish by re-
manding this case? A straight reading of the majority opinion
implied that the Court had no opinion as to whether or not Bos-
tick was seized.336 Moreover, Justice O'Connor was careful to
state that even though our country is facing a drug crisis, law
enforcement authorities must not forget to respect the rights of
individuals.3 7 It would appear at first glance that the Court was
taking a neutral stance.
Nevertheless, despite such claims of impartiality, the hid-
den message from the highest court of the land seems quite clear
on this issue: the facts of Bostick should not qualify as a seizure
under the revamped Mendenhall test.3 38 Clearly, the Florida Su-
overcome the taint of the illegal seizure.
333. In its succinct decision, the court summarized the facts and followed with a
single sentence that "[i]n light of the Supreme Court's opinion, we now approve the
decision of the district court." (The district court decision had denied Bostick's motion
to suppress the cocaine). Bostick v. Florida, 593 So.2d 494, 495 (1992). The factors sur-
rounding the encounter were never discussed.
334. United States v. Madison, 936 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1991). See also supra notes
102-105 and accompanying text.
335. Id.
336. 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (stating that "we refrain from deciding whether or not a
seizure occurred in this case.").
337. Id. at 2389.
338. Justice O'Connor noted that the fact that the encounter took place on a bus
was a factor to be taken into consideration, but then went on to explain that "[w]e can-
not agree, however, with the Florida Supreme Court that this single factor will be dispos-
itive in every case." Id. Justice O'Connor also hinted at what the Court would consider a
19921
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preme Court has taken the hint and followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court.339 Even prior to the Florida Su-
preme Court's reconsideration of Bostick under the United
States Supreme Court's new guidance, it was clear that this de-
cision was already having an impact in other courts on similar
cases around the country. 40
In a recent Pennsylvania case, a state court relied on Bos-
tick to find that no seizure had occurred when a defendant was
approached by police at a train station.3 41 The Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court stated that "[iun Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme
Court held that police may approach persons at random, even on
a bus, ask questions, and seek consent to search." 42 Ironically,
this sounds very much like the formulation of a per se rule find-
ing all bus encounters to be non-seizures. An overview of several
seizure cases involving bus and train encounters that have come
to trial subsequent to Florida v. Bostick reveals that the courts
have increasingly relied on the Supreme Court's apparent direc-
tive to find that no seizure had occurred within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 3
proper result by stating that "[t]he facts of this case, as described by the Florida Su-
preme Court, leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred." Id. at 2387-88.
339. See supra part III.E. As in the first Florida Supreme Court decision, the court
was split 4-3. While six out of seven of the judges from the first decision continued to
view the case in the same way, the "swing" vote appears to have come from a new judge.
Judge Ehrlich was the fourth judge in the original supreme court majority. He appears to
have been replaced by Judge Harding, who sided with the current supreme court major-
ity in finding that Bostick had not been seized. This is a further example of the impact
that court personnel changes can have on decisions. Bostick v. Florida, 593 So.2d 494,
495 (Fla. 1992).
340. See infra notes 341-43 and accompapying text.
341. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 595 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. 1991).
342. Id.
343. See Brown v. State, 585 So.2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding de-
fendant's conviction on authority of Florida v. Bostick); State v. Kuntzwiler, 585 So.2d
1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing and remanding case for proceedings consistent
with Florida v. Bostick); State v. Brown, 584 So.2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (re-
manding for further consideration in accordance with Bostick's rejection of a "per se"
rule against boarding buses and randomly asking for consent to search); and United
States v. Springer, 946 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that Bostick requires the court
to consider all the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable person would con-
clude he was free to decline the officer's requests or terminate the encounter, and that no
seizure occurred under these facts). But see In re J.M. v. District of Columbia, 596 A.2d
961 (D.C. 1991) (finding no seizure when applying the Bostick "totality of the circum-
stances" test to a juvenile defendant not advised of the right to refuse to cooperate).
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It does not necessarily follow that all state courts will be
bound by the United States Supreme Court decision in Bostick.
Under our system of federalism, the states are free to provide
their citizens with greater rights than those afforded under the
U.S. Constitution. 44 This allows states to find that a citizen's
rights have been abridged, even in the absence of Supreme
Court agreement.3 45 Therefore, the possibility remains that some
states may have additional state constitutional criteria (or may
now consider the addition of such criteria) that require police
officers to have at least reasonable suspicion prior to initiating
an encounter in confined locations.
One state that has chosen to restrict the ability of police
officers to initiate consensual encounters is New York.3 46 In Peo-
ple v. DeBour34 7 the court established two additional categories
below the level of reasonable suspicion. In order to approach an
individual and request basic information as to identity or desti-
nation, the police must demonstrate an "objective credible rea-
son. ' 4s However, should the police then continue with more in-
trusive questioning, they must be acting pursuant to "a founded
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 3 49 The DeBour require-
ments are still viable today, and were recently clarified by the
New York Court of Appeals.3 50
344. See generally People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that
the state is free to interpret its state constitution "independently of its Federal counter-
part when the analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened to
undercut the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusions.").
345. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1963) (holding that exposure of
airport luggage to police canine sniffs does not violate the Fourth Amendment) with
People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that even though under Place, the
use of a canine sniff test does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, the New York State
Constitution has an additional requirement that police have at least reasonable suspicion
of contraband prior to investigation).
346. Article I, § 12 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
searched.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
347. 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
348. Id. at 572.
349. Id.
350. See People v. Troy Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1992).
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However, the option of providing greater protection than
the United States Supreme Court requires was not available to
the Florida Supreme Court. In 1982, that state passed a consti-
tutional amendment to Section 12 of the State Bill of Rights." 1
The effect of this amendment was to tie the search and seizure
provision of the state constitution into any Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the United States Constitution.352 By the pas-
sage of this amendment, Florida citizens have, to some degree,
surrendered their right to self-determination. 353 However, if the
state finds itself questioning the role of the Supreme Court in
dictating state Fourth Amendment policy, it may be time for the
legislature to re-examine the situation.
V. Conclusion
In Bostick v. Florida, the Supreme Court moved one step
further in the direction of allowing law enforcement authorities
more autonomy in their field work. The Court, in building upon
the principles of Mendenhall and Royer, held that police en-
counters should not be ruled out simply because they take place
within the close confines of a bus.35 While not explicitly stating
that the circumstances of this case should not qualify as a
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court was clearly
leading the state courts in the direction it wanted them to go. It
351. FUL CONST. art. I, § 12.
352. Included in the new section is the following statement:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible
in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
353. State v. Kuntzwiler, 585 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Glickstein,
J., concurring) (stating that "[w]e Floridians, however, because of a constitutional
amendment in 1982, abandoned any claim we might have for self-determination in
Fourth Amendment cases by voting to add limiting language to our then inviolate sec-
tion 12 of our Declaration of Rights."). On the other hand, the citizens of Florida can be
said to have exercised their right to self-determination by voting not to extend Fourth
Amendment protection beyond what is offered by the United States Constitution. Al-
though referring to the amendment as "immensely unwise," Judge Glickstein subse-
quently notes that, "[m]any, perhaps a majority, of Floridians are as pleased with such
limitation almost ten years later as they were in 1982." Id. at 1097-98.
354. 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
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appeared to make little difference to the Court that Florida,
which has the closest contact with the drug problem, had ini-
tially chosen to find that a seizure does in fact occur when the
encounter is no longer in a wide open space. 5 Courts through-
out the country are currently remanding cases to be decided
under the new Bostick formula, notwithstanding Justice
O'Connor's protest that there is nothing really new here.
For Terrance Bostick, the original star of this show, the case
effectively ended over two years ago. When Bostick's initial mo-
tion to suppress was denied, he accepted a plea bargain with the
state.356 He agreed to plead guilty in return for five years impris-
onment with two years probation (far less than a 15-year sen-
tence that might have resulted from a trial conviction 35 ). As
part of this deal, Bostick preserved his right to appeal the deci-
sion.358 Since under Florida law, drug offenders may not be freed
pending appeal, the case proceeded without Bostick's personal
presence.35 9 Accordingly, by the time the United States Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case, it was no longer of any personal
consequence to Bostick, who had already completed his sentence
with time off for good behavior.3 60 In any event, the legacy of the
Court's ruling will continue to affect future citizens who are sub-
ject to police encounters.
Linda S. Berman
355. Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 1989).
356. Goodman, supra note 147, at 76, 78.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 80 (stating that "[alt best, the conviction would be removed from his
record.").
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